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1. Introduction 
The determinants of executive compensation and equity incentives provide fundamental 
insights into how effectively a firm resolves the divergent interests between top 
management and shareholders. By tying the personal fortunes of senior executives to 
measures of corporate performance, firms can better align the interests of management 
with owners (Murphy 1999). Although there is a voluminous executive pay literature 
using Western data, there is hardly any evidence pertaining to China. The goal of this 
paper is to investigate the determinants of executive compensation and CEO equity 
incentives in China’s listed firms between 2001 and 2005. We augment previous 
executive compensation studies in China, notably Firth, Tam and Tang (1999), Firth, 
Fung and Rui (2007), and Kato and Long (2006b). 
China’s stock market has grown significantly.i This has stimulated considerable 
interest in the appropriate governance of publicly traded firms (Schipani, and Liu 2002; 
Xi 2006). The ownership and control patterns of China’s listed firms are very distinctive. 
The majority of firms are previous state-owned enterprises where the state continues to 
be the dominant shareholder. Firms are governed by two-tier boards, consisting of 
separate management and supervisory elements (Firth et al. 2007). Executives are often 
state-appointed bureaucrats whose effectiveness in delivering shareholder value has been 
questioned (Fan, Wong, and Zhang 2007). Importantly, investors, policy makers and 
academics have also questioned whether China’s corporate governance mechanisms 
provide adequate protection for investors (Allen, Qian, and Qian 2005; Jingu 2007) or 
provide incentives for managers to promote shareholder welfare (Firth et al. 2007).ii The 
context of our study is the reforms initiated by the China Securities Regulatory 
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Commission (CSRC) since early 2000s aimed at improving the corporate governance 
quality of listed Chinese firms. These enable us to study the effectiveness of 
compensation and incentive arrangements (Murphy 1999; Core, Guay, and Larcker 
2003)iii 
Very few prior studies have investigated executive pay in China and none, to our 
knowledge, directly examine CEO equity incentives. Mengistae and Xu (2004) 
investigate CEO pay in approximately 400 Chinese state-owned enterprises in the 1980s 
using survey data. They find the CEO pay sensitivity decreases with the variance of 
performance. Our study, in contrast, focuses on public firms. Kato and Long (2006b) 
examine a sample of 937 firms listed in China between 1998 and 2002. They find that 
executive cash pay is positively related to firm performance and that the state sector is an 
important determining factor. Firth, Fung and Rui (2007) examine a sample of 549 listed 
firms in China between 1998 and 2000. They find that cash compensation is related to 
firm performance and that ownership and governance factors are determinants of cash 
pay. In related research, Firth, Tam, and Tang (1999) examine cash compensation in 
Hong Kong finding little statistical correlation between pay and firm’s stock market 
performance.  
Our study is significantly different from prior studies in a number of important 
ways. First, we examine the determinants of CEO equity incentives (arising from the 
ownership of firm shares) in addition to factors driving executive cash pay. Second, prior 
studies are based on data when the disclosure of executive compensation was voluntary, 
not mandatory. iv This can give rise to important selection effects and potential biases. If 
there are political costs associated with disclosing high executive pay then firms may 
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choose not to disclose under a voluntary regime. We use data from 2001 to 2005 when 
executive pay disclosure was mandatory, hence mitigating such sample selection effects. 
Finally, our study is based on a large sample of listed firms that is nearly the population 
of available listed firms in China. 
We make several significant contributions to the existing literature. Foremost, we 
provide the first evidence on the determinants of CEO equity incentives in China. As 
noted, previous studies have focused exclusively on cash compensation rather than CEO 
share ownership. Using Western data, such equity incentives have been documented to be 
very important relative to flow measures of compensation (Hall, and Liebman 1998; Core 
et al. 2003; Conyon, and Murphy 2000; Murphy 1999). Second, we provide significant 
new evidence on the determinants of CEO equity incentives as well as the determinants 
of cash pay. We document the importance of economic, ownership structure and 
boardroom governance factors. We therefore augment prior studies on cash pay (Firth et 
al. 2007; Firth et al. 1999; Kato et al. 2006b). Third, we use a representative sample of 
firms during a mandatory pay-disclosure period compared to data collected from a 
voluntary-pay disclosure era. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents 
theoretical issues and develops our hypotheses. Section three presents data and methods. 
Section four contains the empirical results. We conclude our paper in section five.  
 
2. Theoretical issues and hypotheses 
Little is known about executive compensation and CEO equity incentives in China, 
especially compared to Anglo-Saxon economies (Firth et al. 2007). We develop a set of 
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hypotheses arguing that executive pay and incentives in China’s listed firms are 
determined by economic, ownership and corporate governance factors (Core, Holthausen, 
and Larcker 1999). Our study makes an important distinction between pay and incentives. 
Executive pay measures the flow of compensation received by an individual during a 
given time period. CEO equity incentives are the change in managerial wealth arising 
from a change in shareholder value and are directly related to an individual’s ownership 
of firm shares or other equity such as stock options (Conyon et al. 2000; Murphy 1999; 
Core et al. 2003). Two CEOs may receive identical flow compensation in a given year, 
but one might own fifty percent of his firm’s stock and the other nothing. The CEO with 
higher fractional ownership has stronger incentives since his wealth is directly tied to the 
firm’s stock price. If the stock price declines, so too does CEO wealth. Since the value of 
current CEO shareholdings can be considerably larger than current annual compensation, 
incentives arising from equity ownership are often economically more important than the 
level of CEO pay (Core et al. 2003). Hence, in this paper we model both executive cash 
compensation and CEO incentives. 
 
Economic determinants of CEO compensation and equity incentives 
The standard economic theory of executive compensation is the principal-agent model 
(Holmstrom 1979; Mirrlees 1997, 1976; Murphy 1999). It predicts that firms design 
efficient compensation packages in order to attract, retain, and motivate CEOs and senior 
executives.v The standard agency model posits a risk-neutral principal who designs an 
optimal contract for a risk and effort-averse agent in the presence of a moral hazard 
problem. CEO pay and incentives are optimally set by the board of directors based on 
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economic determinants, the magnitude of agency problems and monitoring difficulty so 
that CEOs will work to promote shareholder interests (Core et al. 2003; Core, and Guay 
1999; Fama, and Jensen 1983b; Jensen, and Meckling 1976). Compensation incentives 
and monitoring activities are typically argued to be substitute mechanisms that jointly 
contribute to the alleviation of agency problems (Core et al. 2003; Hermalin, and 
Weisbach 1998, 2003). Therefore, even if certain board or governance characteristics 
indicate inferior monitoring quality, the overall compensation package may still be 
optimal if greater equity incentives can compensate for the lower quality of board 
monitoring. The contract approach to executive pay and equity incentives is standard in 
the accounting, finance and economics literature.vi 
 Several economic factors are expected to determine executive compensation and 
CEO equity incentives in China’s listed firms. Consistent with prior research we expect 
large complex firms require more talented managers who have higher levels of 
equilibrium pay (Core, Holthausen et al. 1999; Murphy 1985). Equity incentives refer to 
the change in managerial equity wealth brought about by a change in firm value (Murphy 
1999; Conyon et al. 2000; Jensen, and Murphy 1990; Core, and Guay 1999; Core et al. 
2003). If incentives are measured by the CEOs percentage holding of firm shares then a 
negative relation to firm size is expected (Schaefer 1998). This is because in larger firms 
it is more difficult for liquidity constrained, undiversified or risk-averse CEOs to hold a 
greater fraction of the firm (Core, and Guay 1999; Core et al. 2003; Schaefer 1998; 
Conyon, and Lerong 2004).vii We use firm sales to proxy firm size and complexity. 
Prior theoretical and empirical work predicts that firms with greater growth 
opportunities will demand high-quality managers who in turn receive higher equilibrium 
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compensation (Rosen 1982; Smith, and Watts 1992; Core, Holthausen et al. 1999). We 
expect that firms with more growth opportunities will have higher levels of compensation 
and more equity incentives to motivate CEOs to take actions that promote owner welfare. 
We use the firm’s market to book ratio as a proxy for the firm’s investment opportunity 
set. Standard agency models also predict that the level of executive pay is an increasing 
function of firm performance to align manager and owner interests (Murphy 1999). 
Similarly, executives are more willing to accept higher incentives. As a result, we also 
expect that greater firm performance is associated with greater equity incentives. 
Risk is also considered as an important determinant of CEO pay (Holmstrom 
1979; Mirrlees 1976; Core, Holthausen et al. 1999). Such risks refer to uncertainties in 
the firm’s information environment and operating environment. Consistent with prior 
research, we include a measure of firm risk in our econometric models (Core, Holthausen 
et al. 1999). Previous research has found mixed results on the effect of risk on 
compensation (Core et al. 2003; Prendergast 2002a, 2002b). We thus predict an 
indeterminate relation between firm risk and executive pay and incentives. To 
summarize, we predict that executive pay and CEO equity incentives in Chinese public 
firms will be determined by a set of economic factors related to the degree of agency 
concerns within the firm. This discussion suggests the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1a: Executive compensation is positively correlated with firm size; 
CEO equity incentives (percentage ownership) are negatively related to firm size. 
Hypothesis 1b: Executive compensation and CEO equity incentives are positively 
correlated with firm growth opportunities. 
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Hypothesis 1c: Executive compensation and CEO equity incentives are positively 
correlated with firm performance. 
Hypothesis 1d: Executive compensation and CEO equity incentives have an 
indeterminate relation to firm risk. 
 
Ownership determinants of CEO compensation and equity incentives 
Publicly listed firms in China have distinct ownership structures (Kato et al. 2006b; Kato, 
and Long 2006c; Firth et al. 2007). In most firms there is a dominant shareholder whose 
significant share stake commands considerable power and influence over the way the 
firm is run. This is especially the case in matters relating to the appointment and 
compensation of the CEO or the board. Typically, the largest shareholder in a Chinese 
public firm has an ownership stake of about 40%, the second largest 10% and the third 
largest 4% (our own calculations from the data described below). Ownership of Chinese 
public firms is therefore highly concentrated, especially compared to diffuse ownership 
structures that characterize Anglo-Saxon economies. 
Ownership concentration has important consequences for the pattern of executive 
compensation and CEO equity incentives. Agency theory predicts that when ownership is 
dispersed, individual owners have weak incentives to invest in monitoring and exert 
influence over key corporate decisions (Fama, and Jensen 1983a; Jensen et al. 1976). 
This is the free-rider problem which can be mitigated in the case of concentrated share 
ownership. A high stake in a company’s outstanding equities should provide block-
holders or controlling shareholders strong incentives to supervise managerial activities 
(Jensen, and Warner 1988). As a result, concentrated ownership often indicates that 
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shareholders are able to better guard their interests in their firms. Core, Guay and Larcker 
(2003) and Shivdasani (1993) hypothesize that large share stakes by outside shareholders 
will also mitigate potential CEO entrenchment and is negatively correlated with CEO 
compensation. We too predict that the greater ownership stakes by investors are 
negatively associated with CEO compensation. Since the presence of large shareholders 
is associated with greater monitoring capabilities, they can more effectively monitor CEO 
behavior, ensuring it is consistent with shareholder welfare. In the presence of monitoring 
activities fewer incentives are required to motivate the CEO since monitoring and equity 
incentives serve as substitute mechanisms to promote owner goals. This reasoning 
suggests that CEO equity incentives are a decreasing function of ownership 
concentration. 
In addition, we predict that the type of ownership is an important determinant of 
executive compensation and incentives in China’s listed firms. The state is still the 
ultimate owner of China’s listed firms in the majority of cases; private ownership is the 
second most common ownership type. Our data show that the state was the ultimate 
owner in about 70% of cases and private ownership represents about 27% of cases.viii 
When the state is the firm’s owner the CEO is more likely to be a bureaucrat (Firth et. al. 
2007) and managerial quality is expected to be lower. Managerial quality is likely to be 
greater under private firm ownership. This increased demand for managerial talent 
suggests that equilibrium wages will be higher in the private firms. In addition, private 
ownership is likely to result in compensation contracts that focus managerial behavior on 
maximizing firm value. Conversely, state-run firms might pursue political or multiple 
objectives, such as employment growth, rather than profit maximization. Privately owned 
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firms, therefore, are expected to set optimal contracts with greater pay-for-performance 
incentives. To summarize, we expect firm ownership structure to impact the level of 
executive compensation and CEO equity incentives in China’s listed firms.  We 
consequently hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 2a: Executive compensation and CEO equity incentives are negatively 
correlated with ownership concentration. 
Hypothesis 2b: Executive compensation and CEO equity incentives are greater in 
privately controlled firms. 
 
Board determinants of CEO compensation and equity incentives 
Executive compensation is generally designed by the board of directors or a 
subcommittee of the board called the compensation committee. Previous research has 
indicated that the board’s capacity to design an optimal compensation contract that 
maximizes shareholder value is dependent on the board’s structure (Conyon, and Peck 
1998; Core, Holthausen et al. 1999). In this study the effectiveness of monitoring by the 
board of directors is proxied by four factors identified from the previous corporate 
governance literature. We take as our null hypotheses that a compensation contract that is 
favorable to the CEO will contain higher levels of compensation and lower levels of 
share / equity incentives (Bebchuk, and Fried 2006, 2004). The latter is because, other 
things being equal, the CEO prefers not to be exposed to the increased risk associated 
with share ownership but would prefer instead the certainty equivalent in cash 
compensation. 
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First, it is frequently argued that the board of directors should consist of 
independent and outside directors (Core, Holthausen et al. 1999). One reason for this is 
that inside directors are more loyal to the CEO or the CEO can exert power and influence 
over them by controlling factors such as their career opportunities. Outside directors, on 
the other hand, have incentives to effectively monitor the CEO because they are experts 
in decision-control, subject to less CEO influence and have reputations to protect in the 
labor market (Fama et al. 1983b). However, the efficacy of outside directors may be 
impaired if they are too busy, have limited information about the firm or owe their 
position to the CEO (Jensen 1993). We predict that more independent directors on the 
board are associated with less managerial opportunism and more efficient contracts. 
Second, previous research argues that the effectiveness of board monitoring is 
influenced by the size of the board. Jensen (1993) argues that large boards are less 
effective than small boards, because large boards may suffer free-riding problems in 
decision-making and control thereby diluting monitoring incentives for given board 
members. Therefore, when deciding executive compensation, a large board is less able to 
constrain managerial power and is more likely to compromise and make decisions in 
favor of management’s rather than shareholders’ interests (Yermack 1996).  
Third, a stream of corporate governance research has argued for the separation of 
the board chair and CEO. A number of empirical studies suggest that agency problems 
are higher when the CEO is also the board chair (Yermack 1996; Jensen 1993). These 
studies suggest that executive pay contracts are more likely to tilt toward the CEOs 
interests when the CEO also holds the position of chairperson of the board. Finally, we 
consider the role of compensation committees: a sub-committee of the main board that is 
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responsible for setting executive pay (Baker, Jensen, and Murphy 1988). Compensation 
committees are common in US and UK firms but much less so in China’s listed firms. 
The data reported below suggest only about fifty percent of firms have them in 2005 and 
even fewer in the years before. Previous research has hypothesized that firms with 
compensation committees are more likely to design a better compensation contract for the 
shareholders’ interests. (Conyon et al. 1998; Newman, and Mozes 1999; Vafeas 2003). 
Overall, we expect: 
Hypothesis 3a: Executive compensation is negatively related to the proportion of 
independent directors on the board; CEO equity incentives are positively related to the 
proportion of independent directors on the board. 
Hypothesis 3b: Executive compensation is positively related to the size of the 
board; CEO equity incentives are negatively related to board size. 
Hypothesis 3c: Executive compensation is higher when the leadership structure is 
combined; CEO equity incentives are fewer when the leadership structure is combined. 
Hypothesis 3d: Executive compensation is lower in firms with a compensation 
committee; CEO equity incentives are greater in firms with a compensation committee.  
 
3. Methods 
Sample selection and data 
Our sample is comprised of 1481 unique firms covering 6317 firm-years between 
the years 2001 and 2005. These firms account for about 98% of total firms listed in 
Chinese stock exchanges. Table 1 describes the data. In generating the sample, we 
combined two significant databases. These are the CCER/Sinofin and the CSMAR-A 
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financial databases. The primary data on executive compensation, CEO equity incentives 
and corporate governance are supplied by CCER (China Center for Economic Research) 
Sinofin Information Service. This dataset contains significant ownership information for 
firms listed on both Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange and has 
been used in previous research (Kato, and Long 2006a; Kato et al. 2006b, 2006c). The 
SinoFin data is collected directly from public firms’ annual financial reports as published 
in Securities Time, Shanghai Securities Daily, China Securities Daily, and other major 
newspapers designated by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). Each 
input item is coded twice by two people to provide a cross-check and ensure coding 
accuracy. The financial and market information is obtained from CSMAR-A database, 
which collects financial and market information of all firms listed in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges. These data are also first-hand data collected from CSRC 
designated newspapers. Double-checking among statements published in different 
sources is performed to ensure data accuracy.  
For periods prior to 2001 disclosure of executive pay was voluntary and this may 
result in important selection effects and potential biases, as discussed earlier. These may 
arise if there are political or economic costs to disclosing high levels of executive pay 
(Murphy 1996). In our data set we can probe this selection issue because we have 
information going back to 1998. The number of firms disclosing executive pay in earlier 
years was: 1998=132, 1999=103 and 2000=95. We defined an indicator variable equal to 
one for each early-disclosing firm (EARLY_DISCLOSE), zero otherwise. We then 
compared executive payix in early disclosing firms in year 2001 (when all firms had to 
disclose pay information) with the set of firms who did not disclose early. A simple 
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regression of executive pay on EARLY_DISCLOSURE for the year 2001 produced a 
significantly negative coefficient (β=-36578.48, t=-3.5). This result suggests that firms in 
the voluntary disclosure period have different pay (and potentially other) characteristics 
to the wider population of firms. Focusing on the 2001 to 2005 (mandatory) disclosure 





We model two dependent variables in this paper; the natural log of executive 
compensation (denoted EXEC_PAY) and the natural log of CEO equity incentives 
(denoted CEO_EQUITY). Listed firms in China disclose the sum of total compensation 
for the three highest-paid managers and the three highest-paid board members (including 
executive board members)x. For the period from 2001 to 2005 Chinese regulations do not 
require listed companies to report the various components of annual compensation 
separately, but only total compensation defined as the sum of basic salary, bonus, 
stipends, and other benefits. We divide the single aggregated pay number by three to get 
an estimate of the pay received by the “typical” executive. xi  The use of cash 
compensation is consistent with previous research (Firth et al. 2007; Kato et al. 2006b). 
In our sample period annual grants of stock options are extremely infrequent and can be 
ignored for the construction of the executive compensation measure.xii 
 Our second dependent variable is the log of CEO equity incentives 
(CEO_EQUITY). CEO equity incentives arising from stock ownership directly link CEO 
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wealth to shareholder value and are a major component of total CEO incentives in US 
and UK firms (Jensen et al. 1990; Conyon et al. 2000; Murphy 1999; Core et al. 2003; 
Hall et al. 1998). In western firms the prevalence of stock options and restricted stock 
means that these elements too have to be considered. Previous studies have introduced 
two important measures of equity incentives. First, the “dollars on dollars” measure 
(Baker, and Hall 2004; Jensen et al. 1990; Conyon et al. 2000; Murphy 1999) which 
defines incentives as the dollar change in CEO wealth arising from a $1,000 change in 
shareholder wealth. This is the measure introduced by Jensen and Murphy (1990) and 
effectively captures the CEO’s “percentage ownership” of equity in the firm (Demsetz, 
and Lehn 1985; Jensen et al. 1990; Conyon et al. 2000). It can be written succinctly as: 
$1000×(the number of shares held / common shares outstanding) + $1000 × (option 
delta) × (the number of options held/common shares outstanding). If option holdings are 
zero then this reduces to the percentage of firm shares held. 
The alternative incentive measure is the CEOs “equity stake” (Core, and Guay 
1999; Baker et al. 2004). Following Core and Guay executive portfolio incentives are 
defined as the dollar change in the value of the CEO’s stock and option portfolio arising 
from a one percent change in the stock price.xiii In the results section below, this is called 
PORT_INCENT. This “equity stake” measures incentives as the dollar change in 
managerial wealth from a one percent increase in shareholder wealth and can be written 
as: 1% × (share price) × (the number of shares held) + 1% × (share price) × (option delta) 
× (the number of options held).xiv Again, if the aggregate number of options held is zero 
then equity incentives are derived wholly from share ownership. In the case of China the 
absence of stock options currently makes calculating CEO equity incentives 
 16
straightforward, i.e., based on the CEOs ownership of firm shares. The number of shares 
and stock price are measured at the year end. The shares reported in the data are tradable 
A shares.xv 
A natural question arises: which incentive measure to use? Baker and Hall (2004) 
document the merits of each measure.xvi In this paper we follow Jensen and Murphy 
(1990), Conyon and Murphy (2000), Conyon and He (2004) and adopt the Jensen-
Murphy metric (dollars-on-dollars) as our primary incentive measure (Schaefer 1998). 
However, because our empirical estimates might be affected by the choice of incentives 
measure, we also report a sensitivity analysis using the equity stake measure. 
 
Independent variables 
The above discussion identified a set of factors which determine executive pay and 
incentives. The economic variables are: Firm size is measured as the log of firm sales 
(SALES); Firm performance is defined in two ways. The market-based measure of 
performance is the annualized stock return over the twelve months to December (SHR). 
The accounting-based measure of performance is return on assets, defined as net profits 
divided by the book value of assets (ROA). Growth opportunities are defined as the 
market value of the firm divided by the book value of assets (MKT_BK). Firm risk is 
measured by the standard deviation of stock returns over the year. The natural log of this 
measure is used in the regressions (VOL). The ownership variables are: Private 
ownership is an indicator variable set equal to one if the ultimate owner is a private entity 
and zero otherwise (PRIVATE). Ownership concentration is equal to the Herfindahl 
index based on the five largest owners. Namely, the sum of the five largest ownership 
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stakes squared (OWN_HERF). The boardroom governance variables are: The fraction of 
the board comprised of independent directors (IND_DIR). Board size is measured as the 
number of individuals on the main board (BOARD_SIZE). The leadership structure of 
the firm is a dummy variable set equal to one if the posts of CEO and chairman are 
combined, and zero otherwise (COMBINE). The presence of a compensation committee 
is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has a compensation committee and zero 
otherwise (COMP_COMM). The boardroom governance variables are sourced from the 
SinoFin dataset. Finally, each of the regression models contain a set of industry dummy 
variablesxvii to capture industry variation in managerial talent and a set of time dummies 
to capture year effects and macro-economic shocks. 
 
Analysis 
We estimate the following panel data model using ordinary least square (OLS) regression 
methods. We report t-statistics based on standard errors that are corrected for arbitrary 
heteroskedasticity, following the Huber (1964) and White (1980) transformation method 
(yielding robust standard errors and t-values). The executive compensation model is 
specified as follows: 
EXEC_PAY = β0 + β1SALESit-1 + β2SHRit-1 + β3ROAit-1 + β4MKT_BKit-1 
+ β5VOLit-1 + β6PRIVATEit-1 + β7OWN_HERFit-1  
+ β8IND_DIRit-1 + β9BOARD_SIZEit-1+ β10COMBINEit-1 
+ β11COMP_COMMit-1 + β12CONTROLSit-1 + εit   (1), 
where β1 to β12 are parameters to be estimated and CONTOLS are a set of industry and 
time dummies; and εit is the equation error. In the model firms are subscripted with i and 
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time with t. The right-hand side variables are all lagged by one period (i.e. denoted at t-1) 
to mitigate any endogeneity concerns (Conyon 1998). The incentive equation is similarly 
specified: 
CEO_EQUITY = γ0 + γ1SALESit-1 + γ2SHRit-1 + γ3ROAit-1 + γ4MKT_BKit-1 
+ γ5VOLit-1 + γ6PRIVATEit-1 + γ7OWN_HERFit-1  
+ γ8IND_DIRit-1 + γ9BOARD_SIZEit-1+ γ10COMBINEit-1 
+ γ11COMP_COMMit-1 + γ12CONTROLSit-1 + ζit   (2), 
where γ1 to γ12 are again parameters to be estimated, CONTOLS are a set of industry and 
time dummies; and ζit is the equation error. 
 
4. Empirical results 
Descriptive results 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on executive compensation for China’s listed firms 
by year (Panel A) and broad industrial sector (Panel B). Panel A shows average (median) 
executive compensation in 2005 is 208,641 (146,491) renminbi (RMB). For comparison 
to Anglo-Saxon economies one Chinese yuan is valued at approximately 0.15 US dollars. 
Using this exchange rate, average (median) executive compensation in 2005 is $31,296 
($21,973) US dollars. This figure is striking as it is small in comparison to observed 
levels of US executive compensation. Average CEO pay in S&P500 firms increased 
dramatically from about $3 million in 1993 to a peak of approximately $16 million in 
2000 and while it has fallen back in recent years, in 2006 it still stood at over $8 million 
(Kaplan 2008).xviii US executives earn over 200 times Chinese executives if one uses 
these numbers as a coarse indicator of the differences in the level of remuneration 
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received in each economy. Of course, such cross-national comparisons must be made 
with extreme care since no allowances have been made for purchasing power parity or 
other relevant facts, though to first-order approximation US CEOs earn considerably 
more than their Chinese counterparts. 
Table 2 also shows that executive pay has grown considerably since 2001. For 
example, mean executive compensation has risen from 106,810RMB in 2001 to 
208641RMB in 2005. To estimate the pay growth rate we defined a time trend variable 
(TREND) equal to one for 2001, two for 2002 and so on up to 2005. We then performed 
a simple OLS regression of the log of executive pay (EXEC_PAY) on this trend 
(EXEC_PAY = α + βTREND). The results indicate that executive pay has grown by 
about 18% per year over the period 2001 to 2005 (β=0.179, t=21.26). As China’s 
economy has grown, so too has the growth in executive pay. Finally, Panel B shows the 
distribution of compensation across broad industry groups. It is noteworthy that 
executives in the finance sector receive greater compensation than CEOs in other sectors. 
This result is consistent with evidence in Anglo-Saxon executive compensation studies 
(Murphy, 1999). 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics (averages) on the key variables used in the 
study. Panel A provides information on CEO equity incentives and compensation. The 
typical CEO owns about 0.3% of his firm in 2005. This figure has increased significantly 
since 2001. Recall that the Jensen-Murphy measure can be interpreted as a dollar change 
in CEO wealth arising from a $1,000 change in shareholder wealth. In this case, a 
1000RMB increase in shareholder wealth is associated with 2.67RMB increase in CEO 
wealth, which is more than ten times the 2001 level of 0.21RMB. The alternative 
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measure of incentives, the value of the CEOs equity holdings, has also increased over 
time. In 2005 the average value of the typical CEOs stock holdings was 2.9 million RMB. 
What is noteworthy is that this figure is considerably greater than the current 
compensation (about 0.2 million RMB). It is immediately apparent then that share 
ownership provides important incentives for CEOs to promote shareholder welfare. 
Panels B and C provide average values for the dependent and independent 
variables in our analysis. From Panel B we see that the performance of firms is poor. This 
is consistent with Firth et al (2007) who also documents “lamentable” performance of 
listed firms. Panel C provides interesting institutional context to our study. The 
percentage of firms that are privately owned has more than doubled in a short period. We 
find that 28% have a private ultimate owner in 2005 compared with 12% in 2001. The 
state has withdrawn significantly. Ownership concentration of firms has fallen over time. 
In terms of boards, there has been an increased adoption of Western style governance 
practices. The fraction of independent members on the board has increased from 6% in 
2001 to 34.3% in 2005. xix The main board size is about ten members and is relatively 
constant over time. About 16% of firms combine the posts of CEO and chairperson over 
the sample period. Finally, the proportion of firms that have adopted a compensation 
committee for the purposes of setting executive compensation has increased significantly 
from 7.7% in 2001 to 50.7% in 2005. 
 
Econometric results 
Table 4 provides evidence on the determinants of executive compensation. Panel A 
reports evidence for the economic determinants.xx First, consider the relation between 
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executive compensation and firm size. The evidence suggests a positive and significant 
association between executive pay and firm size (β1=0.262, t=24.17). Executives of large 
Chinese firms, which require more talented managers to run complex organizations, 
receive greater compensation. The coefficient can be interpreted as an elasticity estimate 
since the model is specified in natural logs. A 10% increase in firm sales is associated 
with an increase in executive compensation of approximately 2.5%. The elasticity 
estimates are consistent with prior research emanating from Anglo-Saxon economies 
such as the United States and the United Kingdom. Murphy’s (1999) review suggests the 
CEO compensation-size elasticity is typically in the range of 0.20 to 0.45. 
Next consider the relation between executive compensation and firm 
performance. There is a positive and statistically significant correlation between 
executive pay and firm performance in Chinese publicly traded firms. The models control 
for macro-effects via the time dummies and cross industry differences in the demand for 
executive talent. For example, there is a positive correlation between executive 
compensation and firm stock returns (β2=0.113, t=2.44) as well as between pay and 
return on assets (β3=0.207, t=4.10). This new evidence is consistent with prior research 
(Firth et al. 2007; Mengistae et al. 2004; Kato et al. 2006b). In addition, the hypothesized 
positive correlation between executive pay and firm growth opportunities is found 
(β4=0.048, t=5.47). Executives in China’s listed firms with greater investment 
opportunity sets receive greater compensation. We find that executive compensation and 
firm risk are negatively correlated. More risky environments are associated with lower 
executive pay. In summary, there is considerable evidence for our hypotheses 1 on the 
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economic determinants of executive pay: executive pay in China’s listed firms appears to 
be determined in a way predicted by economic contracting theory. 
 Panel B augments the executive compensation regressions with ownership and 
boardroom governance variables. We find that executives in firms whose ultimate owner 
is a private entity receive greater compensation. In firms where ownership is concentrated 
executives receive less pay. The results are consistent with Firth et al (2007). Hypothesis 
2 is confirmed. We find mixed evidence for the effect of board characteristics on 
executive pay. Firms with a greater fraction of independent directors on the board are 
associated with higher executive compensation, different from what we have expected. 
However, the finding is consistent with some previous US and UK results (Conyon et al. 
1998; Core, Holthausen et al. 1999). There is little evidence that board size is a 
determinant of executive pay in China. We find that firms with a combined 
CEO/chairperson post are associated with greater executive compensation. The finding is 
consistent with more job responsibility, or other economic benefits, from combining the 
roles (Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell 1997; Conyon et al. 2000). Also, we find that firms 
with compensation committees actually have greater executive pay. Although contrary to 
our hypotheses, it is consistent with previous findings in the literature where a similar 
positive association between pay and compensation committees has been found (Conyon 
et al. 1998; Anderson, and Bizjak 2003). Overall, we find mixed support for hypotheses 
3. 
We expected compensation committees and independent directors to reduce 
managerial entrenchment and hence lower pay. An alternative signaling theory might 
explain the results. Firms signal firm and managerial quality to capital markets by 
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adopting corporate governance best-practices such as compensation committees, 
independent directors etc. Such higher quality firms attract higher quality managers, who 
receive higher equilibrium wages and incentives. 
 Table 5 provides evidence on the determinants of CEO equity incentives. Panel A 
reports results of the economic determinants where as Panel B augments the regressions 
with ownership and board characteristics.xxi We find, as expected, that firm size and CEO 
equity incentives, measured by the CEO’s fractional ownership of the firm, is negatively 
correlated. We find that equity incentives and firm performance are positively correlated 
in the case of return on assets but not in the case of shareholder returns. Accounting 
measures of performance seem to be empirically more important. There is evidence that 
CEOs of firms with greater growth opportunities, measured by the firm’s market to book 
ratio, receive greater equity incentives. There is some mixed evidence on the relation 
between CEO incentives and firm risk. Empirically, the estimated models point to a 
negative correlation between risk and incentives. In summary, there is considerable 
support for our hypothesis 1. The empirical evidence is consistent with firms setting 
incentive contracts optimally to mitigate agency costs. 
 The results from Panel B demonstrate that ownership and board variables are 
important determinants of CEO equity incentives in China. Specifically, we find that 
CEOs of privately controlled firms receive significantly greater equity incentives 
compared to CEOs in firms where the ultimate owner is the state. Private ownership 
firms, therefore, provide greater equity incentives to their CEOs. Ownership 
concentration is significantly negatively related to CEO incentives. The evidence is 
consistent with the hypothesis that owners use monitoring and incentives as substitute 
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mechanisms to achieve optimal corporate governance goals. Overall, there is strong 
support for hypothesis 2. In the final column the board variables are added. There is little 
evidence that board factors shape CEO incentives. We find that equity incentives are 
greater when the posts of CEO and chairperson are combined. There is weak evidence 
that fewer CEO incentives are associated with larger boards. In summary, our empirical 
results suggest that incentive contracts are set in a way to mitigate agency costs and that 
economic, ownership and to some extent board factors are all important. 
 
Sensitivity analysis 
Table 6 contains the results of our sensitivity analysis. The dependent variable 
(PORT_INCENT) is the dollar change in CEO wealth for a percentage change in 
shareholder wealth, the Core and Guay (1999) equity stake measure (Baker et al. 2004; 
Core et al. 2003; Core, and Guay 1999). We find that the coefficient estimates associated 
with the economic, ownership and board governance variables are correctly signed and 
generally significant at conventional levels, similar to the results in Table 5. In 
consequence, our previous conclusions regarding the determinants of CEO equity 
incentives in China’s listed firms are robust to the choice of dependent variable used in 
the regression analysis. For example, firm performance and growth opportunities are 
positively correlated with CEO incentives and a negative association is documented with 
firm risk. It is noteworthy that the firm size variable is positive and significant (Table 6, 
Columns 2 and 3) confirming the conjecture that the absolute level of CEO firm-wealth 
increases with firm size, even though CEO fractional ownership of the firm is decreasing 
in firm size (as seen in Table 5). We find that private ownership is positively correlated 
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with CEO incentives and there is a negative association between equity incentives and 
ownership concentration. As before, the evidence on the board determinants of equity 
incentives is mixed. Only leadership structure is significantly positive in the model. 
One potential explanation for the mixed board results is the presence of outlying 
observations in the data. To mitigate the influence of such outliers, we re-estimated our 
models using the robust regression technique.xxii In non-tabulated results we found some 
strengthened support for the board variables. Leadership structure remained positive and 
significant (β11=0.75, t=7.39) and now the board size variable was significantly negative 
(β9=-0.027, t=1.76). Other board variables, though, remained insignificant. 
As an additional robustness check we re-estimated all the models in Tables 4 and 
5 using robust regression methods to ensure the results of our study are not sensitive to 
the choice of estimation technique. All models (executive compensation and equity 
incentives) performed satisfactorily and the broad results documented in Tables 4 and 5 
were replicated. We conclude, then, that executive compensation and equity incentives in 
China’s listed firms are determined by economic, ownership and board governance 
factors consistent with the agency theory prediction. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we have investigated the determinants of executive compensation and CEO 
equity incentives in China’s listed firms. We argue that the distinction between flow 
measures of compensation and aggregate equity incentives is important (Conyon et al. 
2004; Core et al. 2003; Murphy 1999; Baker et al. 2004). Two individuals may receive 
the same cash compensation at a given point in time but one might own fifty percent of 
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his firms stock and the other nothing. The CEO with high fractional ownership has 
stronger incentives to promote shareholder value since his wealth is directly tied to the 
firm’s stock price: if this falls so does CEO wealth. Understanding cash compensation, 
then, is only part of the story; probing equity incentives provides a richer picture. By 
investigating the determinants of both cash-compensation and CEO equity incentives we 
have endeavored to augment the existing pay and corporate governance literature in 
China. 
 Our study finds that economic, ownership and boardroom governance variables 
are important determinants of both executive compensation and CEO equity incentives. 
We conclude that the compensation contracts are driven by agency cost considerations 
and as such the empirical results are consistent with an optimal contracting hypothesis. 
We find that executive compensation is positively related to firm size, performance and 
growth opportunities and there is a negative relation to firm risk. Compensation is higher 
in firms that are privately owned and is lower when firm ownership is more concentrated. 
Executive pay is higher in firms with a greater fraction of independent directors on the 
board, where the posts of CEO and chairperson are combined and in firms that have a 
compensation committee. We find little evidence of a relation between compensation and 
board size. Our results augment other studies on the determinants of executive pay in 
China (Firth et al. 2007; Kato et al. 2006b). 
Turning to share ownership, we find that CEO equity incentives are positively 
related to firm performance and growth opportunities. Incentives are negatively 
correlated with firm size and firm-risk. CEO Incentives are also greater in firms that are 
privately owned and are lower when firm ownership is more concentrated. We find 
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mixed results relating to the effect of boardroom governance variables. Incentives are 
greater where the posts of CEO and chairperson are combined, but other variables 
generally lacked significance. These new results for China are comparable with research 
emanating from Anglo-Saxon economies (Core et al. 2003). 
Overall, our results suggest that China’s corporate governance reforms have been 
reasonably effective in starting to align managerial interests with those of shareholders, at 
least in the design of executive compensation and incentive contracts. For years, investors 
have criticized poor corporate governance structures and the lack of managerial 
incentives to promote shareholder values in Chinese listed firms. Recent governance 
reforms were aimed at deflecting such criticism and improving the quality of capital 
markets. However, there is a suspicion that such reforms were merely window-dressing 
and ineffective. Our evidence, though, suggests that compensation and incentive 
contracts in Chinese listed firms are designed to mitigate agency costs and that economic, 
ownership (and to some extent boardroom factors) are important determinants. To this 
extent, we see some convergence of Chinese corporate governance structures towards 
western best-practice models. However, some discrepancies are also observed. We found 
that independent directors and compensation committees do not curb executive 
compensation. Xi (2006) has argued that the independent directors are usually appointed 
by firms to strengthen ties to the government, increase lobbying power and pose few 
threats to managers’ private interests. More research in the area of China’s boardroom 
governance, and its effectiveness, is therefore recommended. 
Finally, we highlight some further potential limitations with our paper and areas 
that warrant future research. Before deducing that managerial pay contracts best serve 
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shareholder goals much more detailed information about executive pay contracts is 
needed. For example, the determinants of bonus schemes, including performance-
evaluation systems, should be investigated. Moreover, the role of stock options or other 
equity-based payments should be investigated as China’s market reforms deepen. Current 
disclosure rules mean that such information is not available to us and so is left for future 
endeavors. Despite these potential limitations, our study provides the first evidence on the 
determinants of CEO incentives and compensation in China’s listed firms and its relation 




    
Year Number of listed 
firms 
Number of firms in 
the database 
Sample firms as 
percentage of 
population of listed 
firms 
    
2001 1160 1140 98.28% 
2002 1224 1205 98.45% 
2003 1287 1266 98.37% 
2004 1377 1355 98.40% 
2005 1381 1351 97.83% 
    
    
Notes: 








Descriptive statistics: executive compensation 
       
Panel A: Executive compensation by year 




       
2001 944 106810 228218 36033 68500 125333 
2002 1085 124573 129362 47667 90000 153333 
2003 1168 154468 176084 63333 108544 190874 
2004 1285 184176 205846 70000 129333 225160 
2005 1351 208641 332603 79167 146491 250133 
       
Total 5833 160286 232480 58400 107724 196000 
       
Panel B: Executive compensation by industry sector, 2001 to 2005 




       
Agriculture 143 107084 82158 52080 80000 133333 
Communication 39 154951 120444 65967 123533 213333 
Construction 98 161060 151702 64624 119733 196323 
Finance 35 708416 1604382 107000 321334 631000 
Information 
technology 
324 208441 227182 89200 146283 243000 
Manufacturing 3367 147750 208720 50000 97767 180000 
Mining 99 140957 124706 59333 97700 171067 
Others 484 146079 116819 66000 114933 183300 
Real estate 224 223287 267792 76304 154333 276000 
Services 169 187390 202656 70000 116667 250000 
Transportation 229 164543 146277 64800 117700 203333 
Utilities 245 155575 120025 67467 122467 213000 
Wholesale & 
Retail 
369 176332 144329 80000 130000 230000 
       
Total 5825 160369 232597 58467 107733 196102 
       
Notes: 
Executive Compensation is average board compensation.  It is the sum of three highest 
paid board members’ total compensation disclosed a single number divided by three. 
Executive compensation is calculated as the sum of basic salary, bonus, stipends, and 




Descriptive statistics: 2001 to 2005 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for CEO equity incentives and executive pay 
Year CEO ownership 
(%) 






    
2001 0.021 693.378 106.810 
2002 0.077 1535.944 124.573 
2003 0.133 2261.253 154.468 
2004 0.247 3204.854 184.176 
2005 0.267 2905.520 208.641 
    
Total 0.155 2181.606 160.286 
    
 







SALES SHR ROA MKT_
BK 
VOL 
         
2001 11.134 -5.518 11.756 20.028 -0.217 -0.017 2.669 -1.229 
2002 11.367 -5.502 11.525 20.136 -0.198 -0.018 2.009 -1.196 
2003 11.581 -5.246 11.657 20.288 -0.126 -0.000 1.496 -1.309 
2004 11.741 -4.687 12.013 20.469 -0.157 -0.021 1.161 -1.065 
2005 11.854 -4.575 11.895 20.530 -0.124 -0.018 0.890 -0.951 
         
Total 11.567 -5.130 11.764 20.303 -0.162 -0.015 1.604 -1.143 
         
 
Panel C: Descriptive statistics for ownership and board governance variables 






       
2001 0.117 0.243 0.059 9.416 0.160 0.077 
2002 0.170 0.238 0.237 9.952 0.142 0.308 
2003 0.227 0.231 0.323 9.947 0.156 0.416 
2004 0.267 0.225 0.338 9.842 0.164 0.468 
2005 0.279 0.211 0.343 9.691 0.168 0.507 
       
Total 0.217 0.229 0.267 9.775 0.158 0.365 
       
Notes: 
Panel A: CEO ownership is the percentage of shares owned by the CEO (units = %). 
Value of CEO shareholdings is the number of shares held by the CEO multiplied by the 
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firms stock price (units = thousands). Executive compensation as defined in Table 2 
(units = 000s). 
 
Panel B: EXEC_PAY and is the log of executive pay; CEO_EQUITY is the natural log 
of CEO ownership percentage. EQUITY_INCENT is the natural log of the value of the 
CEOs stock holdings. SALES: log of firm sales; SHR: annual shareholder returns; ROA: 
Return on assets; MKT_BK: market value of the firm divided by the book value of 
assets; VOL: natural log of the standard deviation of stock returns over the year.  
 
Panel C: PRIVATE: dummy variable equal to one if the firm firm’s owner is a private 
entity, and zero otherwise; OWN_HERF: Ownership concentration is equal to the 
Herfindahl measure based on the five largest owners; IND_DIR: the fraction of the board 
comprised of independent directors; BOARD_SIZE: Board size is measured as the 
number of individuals on the main board. COMBINE: leadership structure of the firm is a 
dummy variable set equal to one if the posts of CEO and chairman are combined, and 
zero otherwise; COMP_COMM: a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has a 
compensation committee and zero otherwise. The regressions contain a set of industry 







The determinants of executive pay in China’s listed firms 
     
EXEC_PAY = β0 + β1SALESit-1 + β2SHRit-1 + β3ROAit-1 + β4MKT_BKit-1 
+ β5VOLit-1 + β6PRIVATEit-1 + β7OWN_HERFit-1  
+ β8IND_DIRit-1 + β9BOARD_SIZEit-1+ β10COMBINEit-1 
+ β11COMP_COMMit-1 + β12CONTROLSit-1 + εit 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Predicted 
Sign 
EXEC_PAY EXEC_PAY EXEC_PAY 
     
Panel A: Economic determinants 
SALES + 0.262*** 0.292*** 0.282*** 
  (24.17) (25.13) (20.28) 
SHR + 0.113** 0.108** 0.161*** 
  (2.44) (2.28) (2.93) 
ROA + 0.207*** 0.237*** 0.235*** 
  (4.10) (4.20) (3.12) 
MKT_BK + 0.0480*** 0.0603*** 0.0654*** 
  (5.47) (6.57) (5.42) 
VOL ? -0.178*** -0.185*** -0.190*** 
  (-5.78) (-5.87) (-4.85) 
 
Panel B: Ownership and board determinants 
PRIVATE +  0.154*** 0.164*** 
   (4.90) (4.09) 
OWN_HERF −  -0.594*** -0.615*** 
   (-7.19) (-5.93) 
IND_DIR −   0.661*** 
    (3.42) 
BOARD_SIZE +   0.00841 
    (1.39) 
COMBINE +   0.0966*** 
    (2.66) 
COMP_COMM −   0.108*** 
    (3.27) 
Constant  4.041*** 3.697*** 3.686*** 
  (8.34) (5.68) (4.76) 
Industry and time 
dummies 
 Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  5402 5260 3409 
R-squared  0.25 0.26 0.26 
Notes: 
Variable definitions: The dependent variable is EXEC_PAY and is the log of executive 
pay. The independent variables are: SALES: log of firm sales; SHR: annual shareholder 
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returns; ROA: Return on assets; MKT_BK: market value of the firm divided by the book 
value of assets; VOL: natural log of the standard deviation of stock returns over the year. 
PRIVATE: dummy variable equal to one if the firm firm’s owner is a private entity, and 
zero otherwise; OWN_HERF: Ownership concentration is equal to the Herfindahl 
measure based on the five largest owners; IND_DIR: the fraction of the board comprised 
of independent directors; BOARD_SIZE: Board size is measured as the number of 
individuals on the main board. COMBINE: leadership structure of the firm is a dummy 
variable set equal to one if the posts of CEO and chairman are combined, and zero 
otherwise; COMP_COMM: a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has a 
compensation committee and zero otherwise. The regressions contain a set of industry 
variables and a set of time dummies. 
 
Robust t-statistics are presented in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
Coefficients on the industry and time dummies are suppressed for expositional 
convenience. 
 




The determinants of CEO equity incentives in China’s listed firms 
     
CEO_EQUITY = γ0 + γ1SALESit-1 + γ2SHRit-1 + γ3ROAit-1 + γ4MKT_BKit-1 
+ γ5VOLit-1 + γ6PRIVATEit-1 + γ7OWN_HERFit-1  
+ γ8IND_DIRit-1 + γ9BOARD_SIZEit-1+ γ10COMBINEit-1 
+ γ11COMP_COMMit-1 + γ12CONTROLSit-1 + ζit 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Predicted 
Sign 
CEO_EQUITY CEO_EQUITY CEO_EQUITY 
     
Panel A: Economic determinants 
SALES − -0.511*** -0.374*** -0.327*** 
  (-11.12) (-8.29) (-6.01) 
SHR + 0.0244 -0.0441 -0.00281 
  (0.16) (-0.32) (-0.02) 
ROA + 1.216*** 1.897*** 1.580*** 
  (3.19) (3.08) (3.27) 
MKT_BK + 0.0855** 0.0986** 0.140*** 
  (2.03) (2.36) (2.80) 
VOL ? -0.231 -0.259* -0.420*** 
  (-1.59) (-1.88) (-2.59) 
 
Panel B: Ownership and board determinants 
PRIVATE +  1.758*** 1.627*** 
   (9.22) (7.18) 
OWN_HERF −  -2.192*** -2.292*** 
   (-8.13) (-7.32) 
IND_DIR +   0.740 
    (0.99) 
BOARD_SIZE −   -0.0342* 
    (-1.90) 
COMBINE −   0.609*** 
    (4.22) 
COMP_COMM +   -0.0983 
    (-0.69) 
Constant  2.824*** 2.573** 1.013 
  (2.77) (2.57) (0.80) 
Industry and time 
dummies 
 Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  1884 1831 1312 
R-squared  0.16 0.29 0.30 
Notes: 
Variable definitions: The dependent variable is CEO_EQUITY and is the log of equity 
incentives. Equity incentives are measured as the change in CEO wealth from a $100 
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dollar change in shareholder wealth. It corresponds to the Jensen and Murphy (1990) 
“dollars-on-dollars” metric. In this context, with no stock options, it is the percentage of 
shares owned by the CEO; The independent variables are: SALES: log of firm sales; 
SHR: annual shareholder returns; ROA: Return on assets; MKT_BK: market value of the 
firm divided by the book value of assets; VOL: natural log of the standard deviation of 
stock returns over the year. PRIVATE: dummy variable equal to one if the firm firm’s 
owner is a private entity, and zero otherwise; OWN_HERF: Ownership concentration is 
equal to the Herfindahl measure based on the five largest owners; IND_DIR: the fraction 
of the board comprised of independent directors; BOARD_SIZE: Board size is measured 
as the number of individuals on the main board. COMBINE: leadership structure of the 
firm is a dummy variable set equal to one if the posts of CEO and chairman are 
combined, and zero otherwise; COMP_COMM: a dummy variable equal to one if the 
firm has a compensation committee and zero otherwise. The regressions contain a set of 
industry variables and a set of time dummies. 
 
Robust t-statistics are presented in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
Coefficients on the industry and time dummies are suppressed for expositional 
convenience. 
 





Sensitivity analysis: The determinants of CEO equity incentives in China’s listed firms 
     
PORT_INCENT = γ0 + γ1SALESit-1 + γ2SHRit-1 + γ3ROAit-1 + γ4MKT_BKit-1 
+ γ5VOLit-1 + γ6PRIVATEit-1 + γ7OWN_HERFit-1  
+ γ8IND_DIRit-1 + γ9BOARD_SIZEit-1+ γ10COMBINEit-1 
+ γ11COMP_COMMit-1 + γ12CONTROLSit-1 + ζit 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Predicted 
Sign 
PORT_INCENT PORT_INCENT PORT_INCENT 
     
Panel A: Economic determinants 
SALES + -0.0232 0.106** 0.158*** 
  (-0.50) (2.22) (2.83) 
SHR + 0.318** 0.224 0.302* 
  (2.06) (1.55) (1.66) 
ROA + 1.648*** 2.588** 2.146** 
  (2.79) (2.24) (2.40) 
MKT_BK + 0.225*** 0.232*** 0.278*** 
  (4.93) (5.01) (5.26) 
VOL ? -0.375** -0.384*** -0.497*** 
  (-2.51) (-2.71) (-3.01) 
 
Panel B: Ownership and board determinants 
  
PRIVATE +  1.769*** 1.682*** 
   (9.13) (7.36) 
OWN_HERF −  -1.842*** -1.888*** 
   (-6.65) (-5.90) 
IND_DIR +   0.517 
    (0.70) 
BOARD_SIZE −   -0.0173 
    (-0.98) 
COMBINE −   0.671*** 
    (4.59) 
COMP_COMM +   -0.0808 
    (-0.57) 
Constant  12.40*** 9.308*** 6.711*** 
  (11.27) (8.68) (4.42) 
Industry and time 
dummies 
 Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  1878 1825 1308 
R-squared  0.07 0.21 0.22 
Notes: 
Variable definitions: The dependent variable, PORT_INCENT, is the log executive 
portfolio incentives defined as the dollar change in the value of the CEO’s stock portfolio 
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arising from a one percent change in the stock price. It corresponds to the Core-Guay 
(1999) measure. The independent variables are: SALES: log of firm sales; SHR: annual 
shareholder returns; ROA: Return on assets; MKT_BK: market value of the firm divided 
by the book value of assets; VOL: natural log of the standard deviation of stock returns 
over the year. PRIVATE: dummy variable equal to one if the firm firm’s owner is a 
private entity, and zero otherwise; OWN_HERF: Ownership concentration is equal to the 
Herfindahl measure based on the five largest owners; IND_DIR: the fraction of the board 
comprised of independent directors; BOARD_SIZE: Board size is measured as the 
number of individuals on the main board. COMBINE: leadership structure of the firm is a 
dummy variable set equal to one if the posts of CEO and chairman are combined, and 
zero otherwise; COMP_COMM: a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has a 
compensation committee and zero otherwise. The regressions contain a set of industry 
variables and a set of time dummies. 
 
Robust t-statistics are presented in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
Coefficients on the industry and time dummies are suppressed for expositional 
convenience. 
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i  The number of firms listed on the two major exchanges of China’s Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges has increased from 57 in 1992 to 1434 in December 2006 with 
a total market capitalization of 89,403 billion RMB (or US$11,462 billion). The stock 
market booming in August, 2007 even pushed the total market capitalization to 245,300 
billion RMB, surpassing the size of Japanese stock markets.  
 
ii  Our research contributes to a wider accounting and finance literature on the 
effectiveness of China’s corporate governance system. For example, DeFond, Wong, and 
Li (1999) consider how new auditing standards affect capital market credibility;  
 
iii For example, CSRC passed a series of “Regulation for the Content and Format of 
Public Firms’ Information Disclosure” in 2001 to enforce disclosures of key financial and 
managerial compensation information in listed firms. 
 
iv The disclosure of executive compensation information is regulated by the “Regulation 
for the Content and Format of Public Firms’ Information Disclosure, No. 2: Content and 
Format of Annual Reports”. The regulation has been constantly amended since 1998. In 
the 1998 version, the regulation does not require listed firms to disclose executive 
compensation information in their annual reports. The 2001 amended version, however, 
requires listed firms to report the sum of total compensation for the top three highest-paid 
management and the top three highest-paid board members (including executive board 
members). The same terms hold in the 2003 amended version. In the Dec., 2005 amended 
version, listed firms are required to report each individual board member’s and top 
management’s total compensation. This more stringent disclosure rule is maintained in 
the 2007 amended version as well. 
 
 
v Murphy (1999) provides an authoritative review of the economic determinants of CEO 
pay and empirical evidence amassed for the US economy. 
 
vi Core, Guay, and Larcker (2003) define an efficient (or optimal) contract as one that: 
“that maximizes the net expected economic value to shareholders after transaction costs 
(such as contracting costs) and payments to employees. An equivalent way of saying this 
is that . . . contracts minimize agency costs.” 
 
vii Even though the CEOs fractional ownership may be lower in larger firms, the absolute 
value of a CEOs equity holding is expected to greater in larger firms compared to small 
firms. 
 
viii  The calculation is for 2005. The small residual amount is made up employee 
ownership, foreign ownership and other legal entity ownership. 
 
ix We discuss the precise definition of executive pay the next section. 
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x  Chinese executive compensation disclosure is mandated by the Chinese Securities 
Regulation Committee (CSRC) since 2001. Specifically, pay disclosure was required by 
the passage of the “Regulation for the Content and Format of Public Firms’ Information 
Disclosure, No. 2: Content and Format of Annual Reports”. 
 
xi  More recently, the CSRC has approved revised executive compensation disclosure 
rules. From 2006 onwards the total pay of each three highest-paid individuals will be 
disclosed separately. 
 
xii The grant of stock options to executives is a very recent phenomenon in China. Most 
listed firms in China are former state owned enterprises. Historically, these companies 
only issue non-tradable shares to executives and employees, which could not be sold in 
the public market. In 2005, the CSRC launched a structural reform program aimed at 
eliminating non-tradable shares. The reform required listed companies to transfer non-
tradable shares to tradable shares by compensating existing shareholders through various 
ways like bonus shares, cash and stock options. This reform was accompanied by a series 
of changes in the Corporate Law and Exchange Law, which also paved the way for 
granting stock options to executives. In December 2005, the CSRC issued a trial version 
of “Regulation for the Stock Options Grants of Public Firms” effective from January 
2006. This regulation allows public firms that have successfully completed structural 
reforms to offer stock options to their higher management, board and supervisory board 
members. 
 
xiii The literature discusses two broad incentive measures (Core et al. 2003). Portfolio 
incentives are the dollar change in CEO wealth from a percentage change in stock price. 
The Jensen and Murphy (1990) measure is the dollar change in CEO wealth from a dollar 
change in firm value. It is proportional to the fraction of firm shares owned by the CEO. 
For a given firm the measures are simple transformations of each other but they can give 
rise to different rank orderings in a cross section of firms (Baker et al. 2004). 
 
xiv The option delta (hedge ratio) is calculated as the derivative of Black-Scholes call 
option value with respect to the share price. The option delta can be thought of as a 
weight, which varies between 0 and 1, reflecting the likelihood that the stock option will 
end up in the money (Black, and Scholes 1973). For the general model, the value of a 
European call option is simply: c = Se-(ln(1+q))T N(d1) – Xe-(ln(1+r)) TN(d2), where d1 
= ( ln(S/X) + (ln(1+r)-ln(1+q) + σ2/2)(T) ) / (σT1/2 ); d2 = (ln(S/X) + (r-q - σ2/2)(T) ) / 
(σ T1/2); S is the stock price; X is the exercise price; T is the maturity term; r is the risk 
free interest rate; q is the dividend yield and σ is the volatility of returns. N(.) is the 
cumulative probability distribution function for a standardized normal variable and e is 
Euler’s constant. The option delta is the derivative of the call value with respect to the 
asset value: ∂c/∂S =. e-(ln(1+q))T N(d1). Of course, in the case of China where options are 
not present yet this term all reduces to zero, but in the future it will likely be important.  
 
xv  Many private listed company CEOs or board members may be founders or large 
shareholders. For state-owned listed firms, many CEOs have no shareholdings at all. 
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xvi It is possible to show that for a given firm each measure is simple transformations of 
the other. However, differences arise when comparing across firms due to differences in 
the size of firms. 
 
xvii CSRC classifies industries to 13 categories: A: Agriculture and fishery, B: Mining, C: 
Manufacturing; D: Electricity, water and other energy manufacturing and supply; E: 
Construction; F: Transportation and logistics; G: Information technology; H: Wholesales 
and retails; I: Finance and insurance; J: Real estate; K: Service; L: Communication; M: 
Others. Chinese listed firms sometimes report different industry classification in different 
years. When this occurs, the most recent year industry code is applied. 
 
xviii Median US CEO pay also increased significantly from 1993 to 2000 from around $2 
million to just over $8 million but was still around $8 million in 2006. The differences in 
the time series behavior of the mean and median pay suggests boards are increasingly 
unwilling to award very high pay in the United States (Kaplan 2008). 
 
xix The significant increase of independent directors on the board is due to the regulation 
issued by CSRC in August 2001,“Guides to the Establishment of Independent Directors 
System”, which mandate at least one third of the board members in listed firms should be 
independent directors. 
 
xx The models were checked for multicollinearity among the variables. The calculated 
variance inflation factors were less than 3, suggesting multicollinearity is not a major 
problem. 
 
xxi  We estimate the model contingent on the CEO having at least some fractional 
ownership, this is why the number of observations falls compared to the executive 
compensation table. For cases where the CEO has no shares the log of CEO equity 
incentives is not defined. To make sure that the results are not sensitive to truncating the 
regression model to include only positive values of ownership we re-estimated it for CEO 
fractional ownership instead of the log of CEO fractional ownership (i.e we included zero 
as an outcome). The qualitative results that we report in Tables 5 and 6 are not sensitive 
to this alternative specification. Generally, our results should be interpreted as the 
determination of equity incentives contingent upon the CEO having some ownership 
stake in the firm. 
 
xxii The robust regression algorithm uses iteratively re-weighted least squares with the 
Huber weight (Huber 1964) and biweight (Andrews, Tukey, and Bickel 1972) functions. 
Broadly speaking, it assigns cases with small residuals a weight equal to one and cases 
with large residuals gradually smaller weights to improve the estimation robustness 
against large errors. This method calculates standard errors using the pseudo-values 
approach  
